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This paper examines the interaction between innovation and ﬁnancial structure under
monopoly. We characterise the effects of debt levels on innovative investment by
considering a limited liability effect. On one hand, higher debt levels promote both
innovative investment and the outputs. On the other hand, shareholders’ net beneﬁts
are reduced by higher debt levels and net proﬁt per debt is correspondingly reduced
by higher debt level under positive net proﬁt. More importantly, this study captures
the interaction between ﬁnancial structure and industrial organisation without restric-
tion of the interior point.
Keywords: ﬁnancial structure; innovation; monopoly; corporate ﬁnance; debt levels;
game theory
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1. Introduction
As we known, ﬁnancial structures have extremely important effects on ﬁrms’ strategies.
In their pioneering work, Brander and Lewis (1986) established the signiﬁcant connec-
tion between ﬁnancial structure and industrial organisation and many authors further
developed this relationship. Two years later, Maskimovic (1988) explored this relation
in dynamics and derived some interesting conclusions. In addition, Aybar-Arias, Casino-
Martinez, and Lopez-Gracia (2012) considered the optimal ﬁnancial structure. Mean-
while, Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Lin (2013) discussed the effects of ﬁnancial structures
on the economic development while Uras (2014) examined the relationship between the
ﬁnancial structures and the total factor productivity.
A ﬁrm’s proﬁt closely relates to its ﬁnance and ﬁnancial structure (Nie, 2011;
Riordan, 2003; Showalter, 2010). Chevalier (1995) empirically conﬁrmed the existence
of interactions between capital markets and product markets. Riordan (2003) sum-
marised the literature related to the relationship between capital and product markets at
the nexus of industrial organisation and corporate ﬁnance. According to Riordan’s view,
on one hand, capital market constraints on an individual ﬁrm are mainly determined by
the level of the industry and critically depend on product market competition. On the
other hand, capital markets constrain the product strategy of ﬁrms and thereby inﬂuence
product market performance. Since ﬁrms’ behaviours and strategies closely relate to
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their ﬁnancial states, capital has deep effects on ﬁrms or industries. Furthermore, many
industries are capital-intensive and capital is decisive in the situation of these ﬁrms
(Ramalho & da Silva, 2009). From this aspect, how to obtain enough capital is a vital
topic in management issues. Riordan (2003) stressed that capital structure heavily affects
earnings of ﬁrms, which can also be seen in Harris and Raviv (1991). Undoubtedly, this
is an exceedingly interesting topic both in industrial organisation and in ﬁnance, so this
work is focused on capital structure in industrial economics.
Harris and Raviv (1991) pointed out that models of capital structure employing features
of industrial organisation theory entail two categories. One addresses the relationship
between ﬁrms’ capital structure and their strategies in a competing product market. The
other focuses on ﬁrms’ capital structures and the characteristics of their products or inputs.
The ﬁrst category follows the classic papers of Brander and Lewis (1986) and
Maskimovic (1986), and the basic thought of Jansen and Meckling (1976) was
employed to capture the relationship between ﬁrms’ capital structure and their strategies.
Maskimovic (1988) investigated this relationship in a dynamic environment. Brander
and Lewis (1988) further addressed bankruptcy cost under oligopoly structure. Tarzijan
(2007) recently exploited the effect of capital structure to deter invaders if there are
multiple incumbents.
The other category combined industrial organisation approaches with capital struc-
ture to identify product market. In this way, Titman (1984) initially found that liquida-
tion of a ﬁrm may impose costs on its customers. These incurred costs were transferred
to shareholders through the lower prices of ﬁrms’ products. Harris and Raviv (1991)
introduced this in their signiﬁcant survey about capital structure theory.
This work falls into the ﬁrst category and aims to capture the relationship between
capital structure and innovative investment under monopoly. In addition, this article
characterises the effects of debt levels on innovative investment for a monopolist. For
the innovations, this paper follows the interesting papers of Vives (2008) and Sacco and
Schmutzler (2010).
In theory, Brander and Lewis’ (1986) signiﬁcant work motivates this idea to address
the capital structure and innovative investment strategy. In applications, underinvestment
in innovation is very popular, which stimulates further research on this topic to trace the
essence. This paper discusses the monopolisation case.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: the model is established in Section 2,
and analysed in Section 3, where the effects of capital structure on shareholder value
and debt value are characterised. Then some remarks and conclusions are presented in
the ﬁnal section.
2. Model set up
Model of a monopolist in debt with limited liability effect is established in this section.
The monopolist produces product q and the corresponding price of this product is p.
Consumers. Given a constant A > 0, the utility of consumers is
uðp; qÞ ¼ Aq 1
2
q2  pq: (1)
The demand is induced by equation (1), which is stated as follows
q ¼ A p: (2)
In general, A > 0 is large enough such that demand is large enough.
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Monopolist. Given innovative investment I, the operating proﬁt of the monopolist,
without considering debt, is
pðq; z; IÞ ¼ pq cðIÞqþ gðz; qÞ  1
2
I2; (3)
where z is a random variable that represents the effects of an uncertain environment on
the fortunes of the monopolist. The random variable z uniformly distributes over the
interval z;z½  associated with density function f ðzÞ ¼ 1zz. g(z, q), a real function, indi-
cates the joint effects of z and q. c(I) is the marginal cost incurred by production. 12 I
2
stands for the investment cost.1 The above operating proﬁt meets the relations @p@z [ 0,
@2p




@z [ 0 indicates that higher value of z should yield higher operat-
ing proﬁt. @
2p
@q2\0 means that the operating proﬁt function is concave, which guarantees
the existence of a unique solution for equation (3). Actually, the random variable z and
the quantity may jointly have positive or the negative effects on ﬁrms’ proﬁts. In the
other case, the random variable and the quantity do not interact with the proﬁts of ﬁrms.











@q@z ¼ 0. Furthermore, they pointed out that @
2p







@q@z ¼ 0 in three cases, this paper addresses three cases
to capture this problem.
Shareholders. Assuming that the monopolistic producer should carry out debt
ﬁnancing to maintain its business. Given predetermined debt level D, the value that goes
to the shareholders after debt ﬁnancing and the production decision is the equity value,
which is represented by V. After production occurs, by virtue of ﬁnancial policies, the
monopolist is obliged to pay creditors D out of current proﬁts. The ﬁrm sets its quantity
and innovative investment to maximise the expected value of the monopolist to the
shareholders. The value to shareholders and the corresponding notations are all similar
to that of Brander and Lewis (1986).
V ðq; IÞ ¼
Z z
z^
½pðq; z; IÞ  D f ðzÞdz (4)
where z^ is completely determined by
pðq; z^; IÞ  D ¼ 0: (5)
We further stipulate that z\z^\z, which is similar to that of Brander and Lewis (1986).
When z ¼ z^, the monopolist’s operating proﬁt can just cover its debt obligations without
anything left over. If z\z^, the monopolist pays all its earnings to debt holders and earns
zero, and this state seems seriously bad. z[ z^ indicates positive proﬁts for the monopolist.
V/D represents the net proﬁt per debt.
From equation (5) and the envelope theorem, we obtain the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. Higher debt levels decrease shareholder value. Net proﬁt per debt is
also reduced with higher debt level.





@D \0 for z^\z\z and
z\z by employing the envelope theorem. For the same reason, we have @½V ðq;IÞ=D@D \0.
Net proﬁt per debt becomes less with higher debt level.
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Conclusions are achieved and the proof is therefore complete. □
Remarks: Proposition 1 illustrates that higher debts reduce stockholder value. In
other words, capital structure has signiﬁcant effects on ﬁrms’ and shareholders’ value.
The result of Proposition 1 is different from the capital structure theory of Modigliani
and Miller (1958).
The model is given by equations (1)–(5). The following assumption is launched,
which is similar to that in Vives (2008).
Assumption. c(I) is convex and c′(I) < 0.
c′(I) < 0 indicates that innovative investment efﬁciently reduces the incurred produc-
tion cost. This hypothesis is extremely rational and very moderate, and also appeared in
other innovation theory papers, such as Sacco and Schmutzler (2010). To make our
study more focused, other factors, such as bankruptcy costs and tax advantages of debt,
are all not discussed in the paper, although these factors are all considerably important.
3. Model analyses
First, we show the existence and uniqueness of the solution to maximise the value of
shareholders. Equation (4) is restated as follows.
V ðq; IÞ ¼
Z z
z^





with gðz^; qÞ ¼ D ½ðA qÞq cðIÞq 12 I2.
Although equation (6) is not necessary concave, we have the following conclusions.
Proposition 2. Equation (4) has a unique solution.
Proof. See the Appendix. □
Remarks. In general, it is exceedingly difﬁcult to obtain the concavity of V from
the concavity of π. Brander and Lewis (1986) stipulated the solution to be the strictly
interior point, which simpliﬁes the model to a great degree and guarantees the concavity
of equation (6). This article discusses general cases or no restriction of the interior point
solution is made. The concavity is therefore not guaranteed but the unique solution is
shown.
This article correspondingly captures this industry in three cases according to three
types of formulations of g(z, q).
3.1. g(z, q) = z
If g(z, q) = z and z^, ðA qÞq cðIÞq 12 I2  D is concave in q and I. The solution is
determined by
A cðIÞ  2q ¼ 0 and  c0ðIÞq I ¼ 0 (7)
If z z^\z, equation (6) is rewritten as the following formulation, which is also equation
(A1).
V ðq; IÞ ¼ 1






Proposition 2 indicates that the solution of the above system is determined by the
ﬁrst-order optimal conditions of equation (8).
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@V ðq; IÞ
@q
¼ A cðIÞ  2q
z z ðA qÞq cðIÞq
1
2







z z ðA qÞq cðIÞq
1
2
I2  Dþ z
 
¼ 0 (10)
Let the solution of equation (11) be (q*, I*). Then, zD ½ðA qÞq  cðIÞq
 12 ðIÞ2\z or





If z z^\z, the solution is at the corner and the solution is also determined by equation
(7) and





For g(z, q) = z, the following result holds:2
Proposition 3. Innovative investment and product quantity have no relation with
debt levels.
Proof. Equation (7) implies that innovative investment and product quantity have no
relation with debt levels. Conclusions are achieved and the proof is therefore complete. □
Remarks. This is consistent with the conclusions in Brander and Lewis (1986),
while innovative investment is highlighted in this study.
3.2. g(z, q) = zq
Here we address g(z, q) = zq. If z^\z, conclusions are the same as Proposition 3. If
z z^\z, we have the following formulation, which is also equation (A2),
V ðq; IÞ ¼ 1
2ðz zÞ q
1





In equation (13), we can easily examine that q
1
2zþ q12½ðA qÞq cðIÞq 12 I2  D is
concave. Moreover, z z^\z implies q12zþ q12½ðA qÞq cðIÞq 12 I2  D[ 0. The
solution to equation (13) is determined by
f1 ¼




























2zþ q12 ðA qÞq cðIÞq 12 I2  D
 n o
@I





For g(z, q) = zq, equation (14) yields the following conclusions.
Proposition 4. If g(z, q) = zq and the solution lies at the corner, we have @q@D [ 0
and @I@D [ 0.
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Implicit function theorem indicates @q@D [ 0 and
@I
@D [ 0. These conclusions are achieved
and the proof is therefore complete. □
Remarks. @q@D [ 0 indicates that higher debt levels bring about more quantity of
products. This is consistent with the conclusions of the extant literature (Brander &
Lewis, 1986; Dixit, 1980). Dixit (1980) argued that higher debt level acts as an
important commitment of more outputs. Higher debt level correspondingly improves
innovative investment according to @I@D [ 0.
Without the hypothesis of the interior point solution, the conclusion for product
quantity is the same as that of Brander and Lewis (1986). When innovative investment
is introduced, this study shows that higher debt level also promotes innovative
investment, which is consistent with many social phenomena.
Here we address the relation between debt levels and shareholder value if g(z, q) =
zq. According to equation (13), by envelope theorem we have the following relation.
3.3. g(z, q) = − zq
Here we discuss g(z, q) = − zq. If z^\z, conclusions are the same as Proposition 2. If
z z^\z, the following equation, which is also equation (A3), holds.3
V ðq; IÞ ¼ 1
2ðz zÞ q
1





Equation (16) is concave. The optimal product quantity and innovative investment are








2 þ 32 q
1
2 þ 12 cðIÞq
1
2  14 q
3

























2z q12½ðA qÞq cðIÞq 12 I2  D[ 0 by virtue of z z^\z. Therefore,
equations (17) and (18) imply that the equilibrium state is determined by the following
ﬁrst-order optimal conditions






















f4 ¼ c0ðIÞq I ¼ 0 (20)
Similar to Section 3.2, we have the following conclusions.
Proposition 5. If g(z, q) = − zq and the solution lies at the corner, we have @q@D [ 0
and @I@D [ 0.








@q [ 0. The implicit function theorem indicates
@q
@D [ 0 and
@I
@D [ 0. The conclusions
are achieved and the proof is therefore complete. □
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The relationship between ﬁnancial structure and innovative innovation is
characterised and the optimal debt levels are discussed in this paper. Without the restric-
tion of the interior point solution, it seems more difﬁcult to handle this. In three cases,
shareholders’ net proﬁt is reduced with higher debt levels. For g(z, q) = zq and g(z, q)=
– zq, higher debt levels yield higher product quantity and higher innovative investment.
For g(z, q) = z, debt levels have no effect on product quantity and innovative
investment.
Combining Propositions 1, 3 and 4, we learn that ﬁrm debt has two opposite effects
because higher debts motivate ﬁrms’ innovative investment and outputs while decreas-
ing shareholders value. In other words, managers should take both the value decrease
effect (higher debts decrease shareholders’ value) and the competitive strategy effects
(higher debts increase innovation and outputs) into consideration when they make debt
ﬁnancing decisions.
4. Concluding remarks
This paper characterises the relation between ﬁnancial structure and innovative invest-
ment under monopoly. In addition, this study characterises the relationship between debt
levels and innovative investment, along with the quantity of products. Interestingly, for
g(z, q) = zq and g(z, q) = − zq, although higher debt levels lower stockholders’ value,
they cause both higher innovative investment and higher quantity of products. And the
motivated effects of debt on innovative investment and quantity sustain the incentive
debt theory and are a key issue of capital structure-industrial organisation theory. Net
proﬁt per debt is reduced with higher debt level under positive net proﬁts. Furthermore,
this paper employs a linear demand function, which is tractable, and it is easy to extend
to general cases.
Compared with Brander and Lewis (1986), this paper addresses the monopolisation
innovation with limited liability effects. More importantly, this study discusses the solu-
tion at the corner, which seems more practical and more complicated and this study
illustrates that debt has no effect on output and innovative investment under some
circumstances, such as g(z, q) = z.
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2. Furthermore, if D ½ðA qÞq  cðIÞq  12 ðIÞ2[z, the debt holders do not enter into
this industry. This case is not discussed. In other situations, we will not discuss z^z.
3. Brander and Lewis (1986) pointed out that @
2p
@q@z\0 is rare .In this case, from equation (16)
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Appendix. Proof of Proposition 1
We prove this in three cases, respectively.
Case 1. g(z, q) = z
From equation (6) and g(z, q) = z, if z^\z, ðA qÞq cðIÞq 12 I2  D is concave in q and I,
and its maximum is achieved by its ﬁrst-order optimal conditions.
If z z^\z, we have
V ðq; IÞ ¼
Z z
z^
½ðA qÞq cðIÞqþ z 1
2





zdzþ ½ðA qÞq cðIÞq
 1
2













2 þ z^2Þ  z
z z z^
¼ 1
2ðz zÞ ðz z^Þ
2:
(A1)
Apparently, if z z^\z, the above equation suggests that V(q, I) should attain its maximum at the
point of the maximum ½ðA qÞq cðIÞq 12 I2  D. Therefore, equation (4) has the unique
solution and conclusions are achieved for the ﬁrst case.
Case 2. g(z, q) = zq
If g(z, q) = zq and z^\z, obviously, the conclusion holds because the function
ðA qÞq cðIÞq 12 I2  Dþ zq is concave in q and I.
Here z z^\z is addressed. We have the following conclusions.




½ðA qÞq cðIÞqþ zq 1
2































In the above equation, q
1
2zþ q12½ðA qÞq cðIÞq 12 I2  D is concave in q and I. V(q, I) should
attain its maximum at the point of the maximum to q
1
2zþ q12½ðA qÞq cðIÞq 12 I2  D.
Equation (4), therefore, has the unique solution and conclusions are proved for the second case.
Case 3. g(z, q) = − zq
If g(z, q) = –zq and z^\z, since the function ðA qÞq cðIÞq 12 I2  Dþ zq is concave in
q, apparently the conclusion holds.
Here z z^\z is addressed. We have
Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja 639




½ðA qÞq cðIÞq zq 1
2
I2  Df ðzÞdz



























Since the above equation is concave in q and I, V(q, I) should attain its unique maximum from
ﬁrst-order optimal conditions. Conclusions for the third case are also obtained.
The conclusions of this proposition are all achieved and the proof is complete. We further
point out that it is impossible to obtain concave properties but the uniqueness of the solution is
achieved. h
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